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THE NATURE OF SCIENCE AS A MODEL FOR 
TEACHING FOR CONCEPTUALIZATION 
Robert. W Hanson 
Late Professor of Chemistry 
and Science Education 
University of Northern Iowa 
Cedar Falls, Iowa 50614 
Many teachers of methods courses for future secondary science teachers 
probably share my observation that high marks in conventional college science 
courses do not always indicate a good grasp of how science has developed as a 
human enterprise. In spite of efforts of curriculum developers and vast expendi-
tures of public funds to improve science teaching in our secondary schools, the 
typical science background of a beginning teacher consists of a body of content 
with traditional disciplinary boundaries created by departments that view science 
in terms of their own specialized subject matter. Little emphasis is given to a 
broad view of science as a human enterprise, and typical novice teachers go out 
to teach the subject matter they recognize as physics, chemistry, biology or 
earth science. The broader objectives of science are frequently overlooked. 
Many science curricula have been based on the idea that the exponential 
growth of scientific knowledge guarantees the obsolescence of the subject 
matter commonly taught, and have tried to select certain "big ideas" in science 
that are more likely to have long-range applicability. The National Science 
Teachers Association (NSTA) went a bit further in identifying a set of major 
conceptual schemes and major items in the process of science that might serve 
as the basis for science curriculum planning, K-12 (NSTA Curriculum Commit-
tee, 1964). Another publication of NSTA, addressing itself to the junior high 
school specifically, admitted that "When teachers, supervisors and adminis-
trators turn to those who should be in a position to help them, . . . they find even 
the theoretical structure in dissarray," but proposed an "engineering" approach 
to curriculum development, quite apart from "the simpler problems engineered 
by the psychologist in the laboratory" (Brandwein, 1967). That paper empha-
sized that curricular structure should "be responsive to the stable aspects of 
science, its structure of orderly explanation, that is, its conceptual structure. 
Just as orderly explanation is the central product of science, so is concept 
attainment central to understanding the way the world works. Concept attain-
ment is central to seeking the correspondence of thought with the 'real' world 
(the testable world)." 
Paul de H. Hurd (1969) emphasized concept formation in modern curriculum 
theory and attempted to define the meaning of "concept" and its relation to 
"facts." These much-used terms, so central to modern curricular theory, require 
clear understanding not just careful definition. Hurd admitted that the term 
"concept" is not given the same meaning in science as in psychology, nor does the 
word have the same meaning in all school subjects. It is not surprising then, that 
pre-service teachers do not have a firm grasp of the meaning of this all-important 
term in the teaching of science, considering the variety of meanings attributed to 
it by instructors in education, psychology, social studies and science. 
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Hurd relates the meaning of "concept" to "facts" at one extreme and to 
"theories" at the other extreme, referring to the latter as essentially the same as 
"conceptual schemes. " An understanding of what is meant by a "fact" is essential 
to the full comprehension of the meaning of "concept" and "conceptual scheme," 
and it is here that another gap prevails, even though Hurd does say simply that 
"facts are essentially bits of information" and that "facts are available to all who 
perceive them; they are public property, whereas concepts are a private 
possession and represent a personal grasp of the relatedness of data." At 
another point, Hurd (1969) refers to facts as the findings of science, the "bricks" 
of the architecture to scientific knowledge, and generally seems to view facts as 
the observations and data that, to be useful, must be brought together as parts of 
verifiable concepts. 
These statements, whose meaning depend so much on one's interpretation of 
a "fact," leave the definition of "concept" unclear. Conant's definition calls for the 
use of two criteria to identify scientifu facts: "(1) a fact must be directly 
observable, and (2) a fact must be demonstrable at any time" (Collette, 1973). 
Collette, like Hurd, seems to equate "facts" with "observations." 
As we try to develop a model of the nature of science useful in planning an 
effective means of teaching science, let us think about the growth of scientific 
knowledge, the expanding frontier, what humankind has become aware of, and 
beyond that - what humankind is not yet aware of. Are there "facts" in the 
apparently infinite universe of which humankind is not yet aware? 
The answer must be "yes. " We have only to look back a few centuries to see 
that humankind has recently become aware of much in the universe. For 
example, was it not a fact that the planet Pluto existed long before any 
astronomer became aware of its existence? In the same sense, are there not 
facts in the universe of which humankind is not yet aware? 
The answer is obviously in the affirmative, or science as we know it would 
have no meaning. Science, as a complex of intellectual activities, defies definition 
in a few words, but it can be said quite simply that the scientist tries to bring 
order to relevant facts. Hurd summed it up well: "Science is an intellectual 
activity which arises from personal experience and takes place in the minds of 
men" (Collette, 1973). Whether humans will ever be aware of all the facts of the 
universe is a purely philosophical question dealing with "ultimate truth." The 
uncertainty of this question is responsible for the tentative nature of scientific 
statements and the incompleteness of the scientific enterprise. The novice 
science teachers' lack of awareness of this incompleteness tends to perpetuate 
the teaching of science as dogma and the failure to emphasize its revisionary 
character. Few teachers, experienced ones included, deliberately plan lessons to 
illustrate science as a dynamic system of changing concepts and theories. 
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Many science curricula attempt to call attention to the tentative nature of 
scientific theories, and most claim to be based on the development of concepts or 
conceptual schemes. However, typical beginning teachers have not been ex-
posed to planned development in their college science courses and have 
ordinarily not been given much opportunity to see science as an intellectual 
enterprise that continues to grow in the same way that individuals develop 
concepts as they encounter new facts in different contexts. They will falter if 
asked to define a "fact" and will often be stymied if asked to define "science." 
A model that I have found helpful in working with pre-service science teachers 
(and some in-service teachers) represents an expanding region of scientific 
knowledge within a "universe" of facts. The point of the model is that "facts" may 
be considered apart from human awareness of them and may be thought of as 
truths, conditions of existence, happenings, interactions, etc., whether they are 
susceptible to direct observation or not, and whether they are demonstrable at 
any time (using the criteria of Conant). Using letters to represent facts, Figure 1 
shows the expanding human understanding of the universe, having somewhat 
the appearance of an amoeba moving in one direction and then another to envelop 
and assimilate new or known facts in familiar or unfamiliar contexts. 
Fact A 
4 
t)I] The "unknown" 
Fact A in a 
context yet 
unknown 
Fact A 
in another context 
O The expanding understanding of the universe 
Figure 1 
THE UNIVERSE OF FACTS 
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This model not only represents the growth of human knowledge of the 
universe, but the manner in which science as a human enterprise assimilates new 
findings, develops concepts of relating facts in various contexts, and ultimately 
leads to broad generalizations or conceptual schemes. 
The model can also represent the way an individual assimilates new experi-
ences (encounters with facts) into an existing framework of experience. Prior 
experience elicits consistent responses to the extent that a given concept, or 
mental construct, has developed. This varies from one individual to another and 
within the same individual as time goes on. Conceptualization is a process of 
classification or categorization; it is made up of habitual tracks of association 
developed either deliberately or fortuitously. 
This may not be the model of science that is in the public mind nor the model 
employed in science teaching. Science is often viewed as a method for solving 
problems consisting of a series of steps in an experiment. Scientists try to bring 
order to relevant facts and do this as a mental process. Scientists design 
experiments for the purpose of gathering more facts. The interpretation of those 
facts is a mental process facilitated by the degree of conceptualization previously 
developed in the mind of the investigator. 
Collette (1973) points out three different theoretical points of view - those of 
Gagne, Bruner and Ausubel, and separates Ausubel's point of view as supportive 
of the emphasis on the products of learning (facts, concepts, principles, conceptu-
al schemes) as opposed to the processes of learning. Ausubel is also identified as a 
"militant adversary" of those supporting discovery learning and a proponent of a 
sequentially-organized structure for the presentation of science in the curricu-
lum, as opposed to displaying science as a method of inquiry. Ausubel, according 
to Collette, believes that two prerequisites must be met before meaningful 
learning can take place: 
(1) students must not learn new material in rote fashion; they must be ready 
to use an approach which will result in meaningful learning. 
(2) the material to be learned must be substantially relatable to a relevant 
cognitive structure and learners must have the necessary content to make 
connections between their existing cognitive structure and the new 
material. 
Figure 2 is another aspect of the model presented in Figure 1 and relates to 
these prerequisites of Ausubel. Fact "pt observed in various contexts through a 
variety of observations and experiences becomes part of meaningful learning 
when it is "conceptualized," that is, when the information becomes more widely 
applicable and less dependent on context for understanding. Each concept thus 
developed provides a means of understanding and integrating more isolated 
facts, and a basis for generalizing, assimilating relevant facts, and rejecting 
irrelevant information. 
Iowa Science Teachers Journal/Autumn 1986 5 
Ausubel places "meaningful learning'' at one extreme of a continuum with 
"rote-learning" at the other extreme. Rote learning involves only superficial 
connections between new experiences and the cognitive structure and is easily 
forgotten. · 
Fact A observed in various 
contexts 
Concept A (C,J 
relevant 
irrelevant 
Assimilation 
or 
Rejection 
Fact A understood as a general 
principle in many contexts 
becomes concept A. 
irrelevant 
Figure 2 
CONCEPTUALIZATION; ASSIMILIATION; REJECTION 
Ths model has been found helpful in relating one aspect of the nature of 
science to at least one approach to learning theory. It impresses upon inex-
perienced teachers the importance of their own conceptual development in 
congnitive terms as opposed to merely hoping that meaningful learning will occur 
in their students if left to themselves in an unstructured "curriculum." The 
correspondence of this learning theory with the nature of science and the 
development of scientific theories (or conceptual schemes) lends support to this 
approach as ·one alternative among several available to the novice teacher. 
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